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ABSTRACT 
The recall of an event such as a 
robbery has been shown to be affected by 
how closely post-event information 
corresponds to what the witness actually 
saw. The purpose of this study was to 
investigate how the effect of misleading 
information may be influenced by expertise 
of the source of the post-event information. 
Results revealed that subjects recalled less 
accurately when they received misleading 
information in the narrative than when the 
information corresponded with what they 
had viewed, whereas the accuracy of the 
recall was unaffected by whether the 
witness in the narrative was an expert or a 
non-expert. Subjects rated the narrative 
witnesses as having equal credibility. This 
study suggests that the memory for events 
related to a crime-scene may be impaired by 
misleading post-event information, but is 
unaffected by the source of that misleading 
information when the sources differ in 
occupational expertise. 
INTRODUCTION 
A significant body of literature has 
shown that misleading post-event 
information impairs memory for the original 
event (Loftus, 1979; Loftus & Loftus, 
1980). Many of these studies involved 
subjects looking at a slide presentation of an 
event, reading misleading post event 
information, and answering a questionnaire 
measuring recall accuracy. The results 
consistently indicated that misinformation 
did affect recall accuracy (Lindsay, 1990; 
Loftus, Miller, & Bums, 1978: McCloskey 
& Zaragoza, 1985; Tousignant, Hall & 
Loftus, 1986; Tversky & Tuchin, 1989; 
Zaragoza, McCloskey & Jamis, 1987;  
Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989). 
Furthermore, eyewitnesses exposed 
to misleading information on some aspect 
of a previously witnessed event are likely to 
report the misleading information with 
confidence (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; 
Zaragoza, McCloskey & Jamis, 1987; 
Tversky & Tuchin, 1989). However, a 
significant line of research (Bekerian & 
Bowers, 1983) suggests that the 
malleability of eyewitness memory is 
largely due to a mismatch of encoding -
retrieval cues . Bekerian & Bowers 
proposed that the typical paradigm used to 
study eyewitness memory (slide 
presentations, questionnaire containing 
misleading questions, recognition* memory 
tests would bias subjects towards forgetting 
the critical details since the thematic context 
in which subjects recalled did not match 
their encoding context. When order was 
preserved at recall these authors found no 
effect of misleading information (Tulving & 
Thomson, 1973). Zaragoza and Koshmider 
(1989) found that exposure to misleading 
information did not lead subjects to believe 
that they remembered seeing the 
misinformation nor did it reduce subjects' 
ability to accurately identify the source of 
the originally seen details. The results of 
this study do not support the hypothesis 
that misleading information impairs 
memory of the originally seen event and 
suggests that subjects may report 
misinformation from the narrative even if 
they know they did not see it. 
Lindsay (1990) supported the 
hypothesis that misleading suggestions can 
impair recollection. This result was 
consistent with Loftus's original 
hypothesis. Lindsay's study however was 
different from the other studies in that this 
study used the design based on the "logic of 
opposition", and the study consisted of 
informing the experimental subjects that 
they were going to be deceived in the 
questionnaire. It is quite possible that the 
suggestion alone might have caused the 
subjects to be overly cautious in reading the 
narrative and answering the recall 
questionnaire which in turn might have 
affected the results. 
Previous research studies on 
eyewitness testimony have focused on the 
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effects of misinformation on the accuracy of 
recall. However, there has not been a study 
that has studied the effects of correct 
information on accuracy recall. All of the 
previous studies had used misinformation 
for the experimental condition and for the 
control condition used "neutral" information 
that was neither consistent nor inconsistent 
with the correct information. Correct 
information would increase recall accuracy; 
for example, in realistic cases where 
eyewitnesses are not sure of the details, 
correct information might cue memory and 
enhance recall accuracy. In the present 
study one we investigated the effects of 
incorrect information compared to correct 
information on recall accuracy. 
The studies done on eyewitness 
testimony have great implications in the 
areas of social psychology and law. In 
court cases involving eyewitness testimony 
it is important for the witness to be able to 
testify to accurate information. Eyewitness 
testimony is commonly accepted as being 
the truth by juries; however, in light of 
recent studies on the subject of eyewitness 
accuracy, the results are convincing that 
recall might not always be accurate. In the 
judicial setting, it is common to see lawyers 
use "misleading suggestions" to get the 
witness to answer in a way that provides 
evidence for their case (Smith, 1989); 
therefore, it is important to know whether 
or not witnesses can be persuaded to report 
incorrect information. 
In addition, politicians, lawyers, 
and other professionals have utilized their 
credibility to improve acceptance of their 
messages. A study by Chebat, Filiatrault 
and Perrien (1990) investigated the effect of 
credibility on message acceptance, where 
credibility had two component, cognitive 
and affective. The cognitive component was 
trustworthiness and expertness, and the 
affective component consisted of 
attractiveness and prestige. The subjects 
answered a questionnaire on credibility of 
the source and message acceptance. The 
results of their study indicated that 
credibility has an impact on message 
acceptance where the more credible source 
had the greater message acceptance by the 
subjects. 
Credibility may also be 
operationally defined in terms of 
experience. A study done by Okamoto & 
Sugahara (1986) defined a credible source 
as someone who watched the film 5 times 
and the non- credible source as someone 
who watched the film only 1 time. The 
study consisted of subjects viewing a film 
and reading narrative about the film and 
answering questions testing recall accuracy. 
The results of this study indicated that post-
event information affected recall; however, 
perceived credibility did not effect recall. In 
the present study we investigated the 
influence of a different operational 
definition of expertise: the influence of 
occupational expertise(expert(policeman) 
versus non-expert(salesman)) on acceptance 
of misinformation and/or correct 
information. 
To summarize, when subjects 
witness an event and are .exposed to 
misinformation about the event, past 
research suggests that the subjects would 
report the misinformation with confidence 
(Lindsay, 1990; Loftus, Miller & Burns, 
1978; Zaragoza & Koshmider, 1989). 
Whether these findings reflect a rewrite of 
the original memory or a retrieval 
interference is not yet known. We propose 
that if subjects are more easily misled by an 
expert source than a non-expert, then there 
is some source monitoring error occurring 
of either encoding or retrieval. Source 
monitoring error refers to the inability of the 
subject to discriminate between information 
obtained from the original event and 
information obtained from the post-event 
narrative. Source monitoring error would 
suggest something other than passive 
rewrite system. When subjects are given 
statements by an expert as opposed to a 
non-expert source, the research data 
suggests that the subjects are more likely to 
accept information from the expert source 
(Chebat, et. al., 1990). In the present study 
we investigate two hypotheses: subjects are 
more likely to be misled by incorrect 
information than correct information, and 
subjects will be more likely to report the 
information that comes from the expert than 
the non expert source. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
Forty-five graduate and 
undergraduate students (13 males and 32 
females) from Loyola Marymount 
University volunteered for this experiment. 
Approximately one-half of the subjects 
received extra credit in their psychology 
courses for their participation in the 
experiment. 
Materials 
The stimulus materials consisted of 
slides, three of which were critical, 
depicting a theft scene. All slides were 
presented on an slide projector carousel 
onto a white screen. The distance of the 
projector from the screen was 14 feet and 6 
inches. The visual image from the slide 
projector was projected 4 feet from the 
floor. The slide sequence depicted a sunny 
summer day at an outdoor mall. The slides 
began with two filler slides of the outdoor 
mall. Next, a female dressed in a blue dress 
was shown carrying two bags, while a male 
in a white shirt and gray shorts followed 
her. The male was shown taking one of the 
bags from where the female placed them. 
The last two slides in the slide sequence 
were filler slides of the outdoor mall. 
All subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of five groups: 	 Correct! 
Expert, Correct/ Non-Expert, Misled/ 
Expert, Misled/ Non-expert, and unrelated 
narrative. 
Our expert source was identified as 
a police officer, and the non-expert as a 
salesman. We based the credibility on the 
occupational title alone. The post event 
narratives contained six critical items from 
three of the critical slides presented to the 
subjects. Three of the items were from the 
foreground, and three from the 
background. In the narrative containing 
correct information, the six critical items 
were congruent with the slide sequence. 
The six critical items in the misleading 
narrative were manipulated. The unrelated 
narrative consisted of a text of the same 
length as the experimental texts which was 
about women in the civil war. 
All instructions were presented via a 
cassette player. The subjects were seated 
between 8'4" - 13'9" from the tape 
recorder. The tape recorder was placed on a 
desk which stood approximately 3' tall. 
At the completion of the narrative, 
all subjects were asked to answer a 12-item 
true/false recognition test on the event 
depicted in the slide presentation, along 
with a confidence rating of their answers to 
each question. An overall credibility rating 
of the source of the narrative was also used. 
A measurement of credibility was required 
to test the effect of a credible source on the 
acceptance of post-event information, 
correct or misleading, over the subjects 
memory of the actual event. 
Procedure 
Independent variables were (a) 
credibility of the source of the post-event 
narrative (policeman/ expert vs. salesman/ 
non-expert) and (b) the type of information 
presented in the post-event narrative 
(correct vs. misleading). The dependent 
variables were measured by analyzing the 
subjects recall of critical items from 
foreground, background, and total critical 
items. The second dependent variable 
measured was the confidence rating 
subjects gave themselves on their 
recollection of the event. 
Subjects were informed, via an 
audio tape, that the experiment would test 
memory and recall pertaining to visual 
stimulus. They were told that they should 
pay careful attention to the slide 
presentation. Each slide was displayed on a 
white screen for 12 seconds. Following the 
visual presentation, the subjects were given 
a booklet containing the written materials. 
First, the subjects were told to turn to the 
first page and begin the filler task. The filler 
task was a word search puzzle which the 
subjects had to complete in five minutes. 
After the five minutes was completed, the 
tape player was turned on. Subjects were 
then instructed to turn to the narrative which 
depicted the events in the visual 
presentation (either true or false) or trivial 
information (the control). Subjects had two 
minutes to read the narrative. The 
instructions explicitly informed the subjects 
MODERN PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES 
	 16 
THE INTERACTION OF SOURCE AND MISINFORMATION 
that they were not to reread the material. At 
the completion of two minutes, subjects 
were instructed to turn to the questionnaire 
portion of the booklet. Next, subjects 
received a true/false recognition test 
accompanied by the 5-point confidence 
scale. Each subject was instructed to 
respond to each item based on their recall 
and rate their confidence in their responses 
on a Likert scale, from 1 through 5. 
Subjects were instructed not to change their 
answers. The last item of the test asked 
which subjects to rate their narrative's 
depiction of the event (with a credibility 
rating of 1 not at all credible to 5 extremely 
credible). After the true/false test, 
confidence rating, and narrator's credibility 
rating, subjects were asked to complete a 
demographic questionnaire. When everyone 
had finished, the booklets were collected 
and the subjects were debriefed as to the 
nature of the experiment. 
RESULTS 
Recall 
The results of a 2X2 between-
subjects ANOVA (excluding the unrelated 
narrative group) revealed that there were no 
significant main effects of source or 
interaction effects on the recall measures: 
foreground items, background items and 
combined items. Thus the analysis was 
collapsed across source and analyzed with a 
one-way ANOVA (misinformation, correct 
information, and neutral information). 
There was a significant main effect of the 
information type on the recall measures. On 
the foreground measure (F(1,31)=6.704, 
p_<0.05), subjects given misleading 
information scored lower than subjects 
given correct information (M=1.650 vs. 
M=2.536). on the background measure 
(F(1,31)=4.931, n<0.05), subjects given 
misleading information scored lower that 
subjects given correct information 
(M=1.350 vs. M=2.134). Lastly, on the 
combined measure, subjects given 
misleading information scored lower that 
subjects using correct information (M=3.00 
vs. M=4.527). 
Post-hoc t-tests comparing the four 
groups to the control group revealed that on  
questions pertaining to the foreground 
information the control group (M=2.20) 
scored slightly but not significantly higher 
than the group receiving misleading 
information. On the background measure 
the control group (M=1.80) scored slightly 
but not significantly higher than the 
misleading information group. 
Confidence 
There were no significant main 
effects of confidence on source or 
information type in the results. There was a 
significant interaction between the two 
variables, F(1,31)= 4.088, a<.0 5. 
However, planned independent t-tests did 
not reveal any significant differences 
between the means. 
Credibility 
No significant main or interaction 
effects were observed for credibility or 
information type. 
DISCUSSION 
In this study we investigated 
whether subjects are likely to be misled by 
misinformation when this information is 
given in a narrative form compared to 
reinforcement through repetition in the same 
narrative format. As expected, subjects 
given misleading information in a post-
event narrative obtained lower recall scores 
than those subjects who received correct 
information. These results are consistent 
with previous findings by Lindsay (1990), 
Tousignant, Hall, and Loftus (1986), and 
Zaragoza, Jamis, and McClosky (1987). In 
each of these studies results indicated that 
misleading suggestions can interfere with a 
subject's ability to recollect event details. 
This phenomenon has been referred to as 
the "misinformation effect" (Tousignant, 
Hall, and Loftus, 1986). 
Several reasons for this memory 
impairment have been suggested: (1) 
demand characteristics, (2) higher rate of 
correct guessing; and (3) differential 
response criteria for report of event details 
on control and misled items (Lindsay, 
1990) and overwriting of the original 
memory (Loftus, Miller & Burns, 1978). 
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Although the ongoing debate among 
cognitive psychologists regarding what 
actually happens to the original information 
is still unsettled, our results and previous 
studies continue to indicate that misleading 
post-event information does indeed affect a 
subject's ability to recall the original 
information. 
The lack of significant findings for 
the source variable suggests that subjects 
may not have had this information available 
to them at retrieval time. This may have 
occurred because subjects were insensitive 
to source at encoding or that, at retrieval, 
subjects did not distinguish between the 
original memory and the narrative source. 
This apparently occurred regardless of 
whether the narrative information was 
misleading or correct, or from an expert or 
non-expert. Expertise in this study was 
assigned, after Bregman and McAllister 
(1982), according to competence (i.e. 
personal knowledge of and understanding 
about the material). The lack of any 
differences in credibility ratings may have 
been due to our operational definition of 
credibility. Occupational title alone may 
provide insufficient information to subjects 
for them to make an accurate judgment of 
credibility. It may also have provided the 
subjects with inadequate data for them to 
distinguish, at encoding or retrieval, 
between the original memory, or the 
narrative information. Another reason for 
this result may have been sociological in 
that the study was conducted in Los 
Angeles near the site of the Rodney King 
police brutality incident within four months 
of the incident. Police credibility may have 
been undermined in our sample by this 
incident. 
If subjects were unable to 
discriminate one source of information from 
another at recall, then their confidence 
levels would be expected to be similar for 
these retrievals. We found that subjects had 
similar confidence levels regardless of 
whether they had read the misleading, 
correct or neutral narrative, and whether 
there narratives were from an expert or non-
expert source. These findings may be 
attributed to source monitoring errors. 
Source monitoring error refers to the 
inability of the subject to discriminate  
between information obtained from the 
original event (source #1) and information 
obtained from the post-event narrative 
(source #2). Because of the lack of ability 
to discriminate, a person is likely to recall 
incorrect information from the second 
source or post-event narrative, believe it as 
being correct and rate himself as being 
confident in his recall of incorrect 
information. This hypothesis has been 
supported by other researchers (Cole & 
Loftus, 1979; Greene, Flynne Loftus, 
1982). 
In studies of eyewitness testimony, 
internal validity versus external or 
ecological validity is a big issue. The 
question that arises, is how can the results 
from an experiment executed under very 
controlled circumstances be applied to 
general society? 
This study was conducted using a 
realistic slide presentation to simulate an 
actual crime scene and realistic source. The 
goal was to simulate a less controlled 
environment, and increase ecological 
validity. 
The applications of this study and 
others like it are many, such studies touch 
on areas ranging from the proceedings 
carried out in the court room to research 
being carried out in areas of psychology 
such as social or cognitive psychology. In 
terms of court proceedings, research can 
affect how witnesses are handled during 
questioning so their recall can be guaranteed 
to be as unaffected as possible by post-
event information in the form of reports, 
and repeated questioning by various 
sources ranging from police investigators to 
attorneys. 
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